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Objective Mens Rea and Attenuated
Subjectivism: Guidance from Justice
Charron in R. v. Beatty
Palma Paciocco*

I. INTRODUCTION
Justin Ronald Beatty was driving on the Trans-Canada Highway
on July 23, 2003 when, for no apparent reason, his truck suddenly
crossed the solid centre line and collided with an oncoming car, killing
three people. Beatty was charged with dangerous operation of a motor
vehicle causing death. He was acquitted at trial on the grounds that his
momentary lapse of attention was not enough to establish fault. The
Crown appealed, and the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial after concluding that the trial judge had misapplied the fault standard. Beatty
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which undertook to clarify the
test for penal negligence.1 Writing for the majority, Charron J. expounded
that test and restored Beatty’s acquittal. Her judgment offers cogent
guidance on a thorny question in criminal law: when is a person criminally liable for causing harm he or she neither intends nor foresees?

*
S.J.D. candidate, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to the organizers of, and participants in,
the Symposium Celebrating the Contributions of Justice Louise Charron; to Graham Mayeda, Lisa
Kelly and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper; to
Kenji Tokawa for careful editing; to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doctoral
Fellowship program for financial support during the period of this paper’s preparation; and to Justice
Louise Charron, for whom I had the honour of clerking in 2010-2011, for her tremendous mentorship.
1
Penal negligence is distinct from criminal negligence. Criminal negligence is a statutory
offence (Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s. 219). To make out criminal negligence, the Crown
must prove, inter alia, that the accused’s act or omission “represented a marked and substantial
departure (as opposed to a marked departure) from the conduct of a reasonably prudent [person] in
circumstances where the accused either recognized and ran an obvious and serious risk … or,
alternatively, gave no thought to that risk”: R. v. F. (J.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 62, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 215,
at para. 9 (S.C.C.) (emphasis in original). Penal negligence is the mens rea requirement for all other
negligence-based offences. The standard for penal negligence is a marked departure from the
standard of care of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances. The marked departure standard
is discussed infra, notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
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A core principle of Canadian criminal law is that a wrongful act does
not suffice to establish criminal culpability; the accused must also possess a guilty mind. This principle is often expressed via the maxim actus
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea: the act is not culpable unless the mind is
guilty. Although this maxim is ubiquitous, it is hardly instructive, for it
immediately begs the question what is a guilty mind?2 This question is so
deeply contested and morally freighted as to seem intractable.3 Nevertheless, it remains critically important we address it. The guilty mind
requirement is a key means by which we seek to ensure that only blameworthy people are held criminally liable. Our insistence that criminal
liability be reserved for the blameworthy is at the core of our criminal
justice culture. We believe criminal punishment is justified, and justifiably stigmatizing, because we take it to accord with our broader moral
judgments. Our beliefs about blameworthiness thus animate and validate
the criminal justice system even as we continue to debate them.
One of the most controversial aspects of the guilty mind question is
the status of objective mens rea offences. The paradigmatic crime is a
wrongful act accompanied by an overt mental state such as intent or
recklessness.4 This type of crime — a subjective mens rea offence — can
be contrasted with objective mens rea offences. The latter punish harmful
acts that fall below objective standards of behaviour without regard
to the defendant’s subjective mental state. Examples include dangerous
operation of a motor vehicle, the negligence-based crime with which
Beatty was charged.5 Canadian courts have generally upheld objective
2
See, e.g., Rosemary Cairns Way, “The Charter, the Supreme Court and the Invisible
Politics of Fault” (1992) 12 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 128, at 149 [hereinafter “Cairns Way,
‘Politics of Fault’”], noting that the maxim is “singularly unhelpful as a unifying principle”.
3
“Criminal law is a species of political and moral philosophy. … If the rationale or a
limiting condition of criminal punishment is personal desert, then legal theory invariably
interweaves with philosophical claims about wrongdoing, culpability, justifying circumstances and
excuses”: George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1978), at xix.
4
A person is reckless if she perceives that her intended actions will create a risk of harm
but decides to proceed anyway. She does not intend to cause harm per se, but she deliberately risks
it: R. v. Sansregret, [1985] S.C.J. No. 23, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570 (S.C.C.). Recklessness is also called
“advertent negligence”. It is contrasted with inadvertent negligence, which, as in this paper, is often
referred to simply as “negligence”. Whereas the reckless or advertently negligent person takes a risk
she actually foresees, the negligent person takes a risk that is objectively foreseeable, but which she
does not personally foresee.
5
Recently, in R. v. H. (A.D.), [2013] S.C.J. No. 28, 2013 SCC 28 (S.C.C.), Cromwell J.
identified “five main types of objective fault offences in the Code”: offences defined in terms of
dangerous conduct (e.g., dangerous driving); those defined in terms of careless conduct (e.g., the
careless storage of firearms); predicate offences, which punish harmful consequences in the absence
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mens rea offences, but they remain controversial.6 Some theorists, “subjectivists”, argue that only advertent conduct is blameworthy. They
criticize objective mens rea offences for punishing inadvertent conduct.7
Others, “contextualists”, delineate blameworthiness with reference to
social expectations and harm. In their view, there is no prima facie problem with objective mens rea offences because it may be appropriate to
punish a person whose inadvertent conduct falls below community standards and causes harm.8
This paper intervenes in the subjectivism-contextualism debate by
suggesting a new approach to conceptualizing blameworthiness, one that
is reflected in Charron J.’s judgment in R. v. Beatty.9 I call this approach
the “attenuated subjectivist approach”, and I contrast it with strict subjectivism. Both types of subjectivism are grounded in the principle that an
act or omission is only blameworthy if it reflects a choice on the part of
the defendant. Whereas strict subjectivists maintain that only those who
deliberately choose to commit prohibited acts or omissions are blameworthy, attenuated subjectivism rests on a more expansive notion of
choice. In advancing the attenuated subjectivist approach, I maintain that
people may be blamed for committing prohibited acts if those acts reflect
their moral agency, and I assess whether acts reflect moral agency by
asking whether the actors could and should have done otherwise. This
assessment references social standards, but unlike the contextualist
analysis, it retains a primary focus on the defendant’s exercise of choice.
I conclude that some objective mens rea offences are justified because
some negligent actions reflect moral agency.
The attenuated subjectivist approach is admittedly of limited
assistance in assessing the fault requirements for particular offences
because it begs the key normative question: when is it fair to say
someone should have acted differently? To answer this question, we must
adopt criteria for assessing blameworthiness. The tort law standard of
care is of no direct assistance here because it is not sufficiently restricted
to ensure that only the morally blameworthy are criminally punished; the
of subjective foresight of harm; offences based on criminal negligence (i.e., the statutory offence of
criminal negligence; see supra, note 1); and duty-based offences (e.g., failing to provide the
necessaries of life).
6
The scholarly debates about objective mens rea are discussed at infra, Part II; the Court’s
jurisprudence on the issue is discussed at infra, Part III.
7
See infra, Part II.1.
8
See, infra, Part II.2.
9
[2008] S.C.J. No. 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Beatty”].
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claim that someone “should” have acted differently has far heavier
normative implications in the criminal context than in the tort context.10
Nor can we simply import notions about moral blameworthiness from
outside the law. These are too contested to serve as stable legal criteria. So
while the attenuated subjectivist approach homes in on the key question, it
leaves it open.
The approach does, however, apply readily to objective mens rea offences in one context, that of licensed activities. It is fair to presume
people who perform licensed activities can and should meet the requisite
standard of care. Justice Charron articulates the rationale for this presumption in Beatty. She explains that people who engage in licensed
activities are presumptively aware of the standard of care and capable of
meeting it. They presumptively can meet the standard. They are, moreover, on notice that the standard will be enforced, having agreed to abide
by it when they chose to undertake the voluntary licensed activity. We
can therefore presumptively claim they should meet the standard without
triggering debates about moral blameworthiness.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II introduces subjectivism and
contextualism. Part III provides a very brief overview of the Court’s jurisprudence on objective and subjective mens rea leading up to Beatty. This
jurisprudence is not entirely consistent with either subjectivism or contextualism. The Court has endorsed subjectivist principles and enshrined
some of them as section 7 principles of fundamental justice,11 yet it has
also endorsed numerous objective mens rea offences and has resisted constitutionalizing subjectivism in general. This paper does not aim to
reconcile all of the Court’s mens rea decisions, though Part III does examine a common explanation for their trajectory. Part III is intended to
provide background while highlighting how salient the objective mens rea
debate remains today. Part IV introduces and defends the attenuated subjectivist approach. Part V completes the analysis through a close reading of
Charron J.’s reasons in Beatty. Those reasons clarified the test for penal
negligence by casting it in attenuated subjectivist terms.

10

See text accompanying, infra, note 96.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. Section 7 of the
Charter states, “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
11
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II. SUBJECTIVISM AND CONTEXTUALISM
Scholars and jurists have long debated the appropriateness of objective mens rea offences.12 In large measure, the debate turns on competing
understandings of blameworthiness. Subjectivists view moral blameworthiness as a necessary (though insufficient) condition for criminal guilt,
and they believe conduct is not morally blameworthy unless engaged in
freely and consciously.13 They therefore think criminal liability should be
reserved for those who consciously choose to perform prohibited acts.14
Contextualists assess blameworthiness in light of social standards and
harmful outcomes.15 From their perspective, it may be appropriate to
criminally punish those who unintentionally cause harm by falling below
social expectations.
1. Subjectivism
Subjectivism reflects a classically liberal understanding of the state’s
relationship with individuals.16 According to this line of thought, the state
should maximize individual autonomy by reserving criminal sanctions
for those who choose to commit unlawful acts. Subjectivists regard mens
rea doctrines as a key means of enforcing this limitation on the criminal
12

See, e.g., Albert Lévitt, “Extent and Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea” (1923) 17 Ill. L.
Rev. 578; Francie Bowes Sayre, “Mens Rea” (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974; Barbara Wootton, Crime
and the Criminal Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1963); H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility:
Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) [hereinafter “Hart”];
George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
13
See, e.g., Hart, id.; Kent Roach, “Mind the Gap: Canada’s Different Criminal and
Constitutional Standards of Fault” (2011) 61 U.T.L.J. 545, at 575 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Different
Standards of Fault’”], David M. Paciocco, “Subjective and Objective Standards of Fault for Offences
and Defences” (1995) 59 Sask. L. Rev. 271, at 309 (now Justice David M. Paciocco, Ontario Court
of Justice) [hereinafter “Paciocco, ‘Subjective and Objective Standards’”].
14
Brian Rolfes, “The Golden Thread of Criminal Law – Moral Culpability and Sexual
Assault” (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 87, at para. 28 [hereinafter “Rolfes”]. See also Alan Brudner, “Guilt
under the Charter: The Lure of Parliamentary Supremacy” (1998) 40 Crim. L.Q. 287, at 317, presenting
a somewhat different criticism of negligence-based criminal offences. In Brudner’s view, these offences
are “morally problematic” because “punishment is justified in a free society only in the exceptional case
where the individual has himself willed it through a wilful denial of the rights of personality, for in that
case alone do we honour the autonomy of the person in the very act of taking it away”.
15
See, e.g., James Stribopoulos, “The Constitutionalization of ‘Fault’ in Canada: A
Normative Critique” (1999) 42 Crim. L.Q. 227 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos”]; Cairns Way, “Politics
of Fault”, supra, note 2; Rosemary Cairns Way, “Culpability and the Equality Value: The Legacy of
the Martineau Dissent” (2003) 15 C.J.W.L. 53 [hereinafter “Cairns Way, ‘Culpability’”].
16
Cairns Way, “Politics of Fault”, id., at 134 (identifying and criticizing subjectivism’s
liberal premises).
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law power. According to H.L.A. Hart, mens rea doctrines “[respect] the
claims of the individual as such, or at least as a choosing being, and distribute [the law’s] coercive sanctions in a way that reflects this respect
for the individual. This surely is very central in the notion of justice
…”.17 Subjectivists express concern that without rigorous mens rea doctrines, the state might punish individuals for actions that, while
dangerous, do not reflect a conscious choice to cause or risk harm.18
Because subjectivists are concerned about state overreach, they are
suspicious of legal analyses that use policy goals to identify the mens rea
requirements for particular offences (e.g., an analysis that says proof of
penal negligence suffices to establish dangerous driving because road
safety is a pressing issue19). They believe this type of analysis risks
criminalizing behaviour that is potentially injurious but morally blameless.20 They therefore favour systematic analyses that deduce particular
mens rea requirements from abstract fault principles, rather than extrapolating them from policy considerations.
Finally, because subjectivists are partial to abstract analyses and are
concerned about state overreach, they tend to favour a strong judicial role
in determining mens rea requirements. In their view, the courts are best
placed to support subjective mens rea principles and to restrain overzealous legislators who, for their part, have an illiberal tendency to
criminalize dangerous behaviour with insufficient regard to individual
desert.21 Subjectivists therefore encourage courts to actively shape mens
rea standards.
17

Hart, supra, note 12, at 49 (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., Don R. Stuart, “The Need to Codify Clear, Realistic and Honest Measures of
Mens Rea and Negligence” (1972) 15 Crim. L.Q. 160, at 183: “Above all, the concept of mens rea
must be retained as a civil libertarian tool available for the lawyer to use to fend off society’s
assertion that the accused be formally controlled and punished.”
19
Justice Cory deployed this argument, among others, in R. v. Hundal, [1993] S.C.J.
No. 29, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 867, at 884 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hundal”].
20
See, e.g., Alan N. Young, “Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental Justice and the Minimum
Content of Criminal Law” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 441 [hereinafter “Young”]; and Paciocco,
“Subjective and Objective Standards”, supra, note 13. One can subscribe to this perspective while
also recognizing a key limitation of liberalism: its focus on individual choice, conceptualized in the
abstract, tends to obscure socio-economic factors that give some individuals a much larger array of
options than others. One can believe that an exercise of individual choice should be a necessary
condition for imposing criminal liability while also maintaining that broad structural changes are
necessary to maximize equal access to options.
21
See, e.g., Young, id., at 442: “The conventional wisdom that courts cannot second-guess
the policy choices made by a legislature rings hollow in a day and age when resort to criminal law as
a response to a perceived social problem has become routine and perfunctory.” See also Kent Roach,
“Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and Canadian
18
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2. Contextualism
Contextualists resist the subjectivist emphasis on individual intent
and focus instead on community standards.22 James Stribopoulos, for
example, writes:
If a person causes harm, in circumstances under which any reasonable
member of the community would have realized that harm was a likely
consequence of the conduct, it is not the presence or absence of choice
which is relevant to blameworthiness. It is the failure to conduct oneself
in a fashion commensurate with ordinary community expectations which
transforms the conduct from something neutral, to something deserving
of condemnation.23

In the same vein, Rosemary Cairns Way encourages us to zoom out from
a narrow focus on the defendant’s experience to consider the victim’s
perspective as well as community attitudes about the act or omission in
question.24
Contextualists place a lower value on logical consistency than their
subjectivist counterparts and a greater premium on context-sensitivity.
They favour an inductive, case-by-case approach to determine the mens
rea requirements for particular offences, one that looks to the specific
context and purpose of each crime. Cairns Way, for example, criticizes
the majority position in R. v. Martineau for
assum[ing] that the development of an overarching theory is desirable
and necessary, that the fairest way to measure responsibility is to apply
generalized rules to particular situations, and that logical consistency
and analytic clarity are preeminent values.25

She praises L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissent for resisting “formulaic reasoning”
in favour of a more comprehensive, contextualized, and multifaceted fault

Legislatures” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481, at 512 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Dialogues’”], discussing the
different concerns of courts and legislatures vis-à-vis criminal law and advocating for a balanced
“dialogue” approach.
22
Cairns Way, “Politics of Fault”, supra, note 2, at 178.
23
Stribopoulos, supra, note 15, at 270-71.
24
Cairns Way, “Politics of Fault”, supra, note 2; Cairns Way, “Culpability”, supra, note 15.
See also Dennis Klinck, “The Charter and Substantive Criminal ‘Justice’” (1993) 42 U.N.B.L.J.
191, at 211, suggesting that “an adequate account of justice might require a much more subtle and
far-reaching inquiry into the social contexts of criminality than a narrowly focused attempt to equate
moral blameworthiness, (defined in terms of subjective awareness), with penal, (or other),
consequences for the accused”.
25
Cairns Way, “Culpability”, supra, note 15, at 62.
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analysis.26 Similarly, Nancy Thomson approves of Wilson J.’s concurring
reasons in Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2),
which frame the fault requirement in a context-specific manner.27
Contra the subjectivists, Thomson warns us that abstract fault analyses risk “overstat[ing] principles in an effort to settle the issue”, thereby
generating skewed standards and foreclosing ongoing analysis.28 Contextualists value ongoing analysis because they figure blameworthiness as a
contingent, evolving concept. For the same reason, they believe judges
should assume a limited role in determining mens rea standards so as to
enable legislative experimentation.29
The foregoing descriptions of subjectivism and contextualism are
simplistic, but they suffice to frame the discussion. Not all scholars and
jurists are rigid subjectivists or objectivists. For example, some scholars
endorse the subjectivist account of blameworthiness but nevertheless
accept certain objective mens rea offences.30 The same is true of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, to which I now turn.

III. THE COURT’S PRE-BEATTY JURISPRUDENCE ON
OBJECTIVE MENS REA
The Supreme Court has issued a number of decisions bearing on
objective mens rea. This section provides a brief overview of the key
cases leading up to Beatty, then offers an explanation for their surprising
trajectory.

26

Id.
Nancy K. Thomson, “Fundamental Justice, Stigma and Fault” (1994) 52 U.T. Fac. L.
Rev. 379, at 384. Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference”].
28
Id., at 386.
29
See especially Cairns Way, “Politics of Fault”, supra, note 2, at 145 and 176. See also
Roach, “Dialogues”, supra, note 21, at 512, noting that although judges are institutionally well
positioned to consider fault, “fault is a contested and evolving concept and it is not clear that courts
should impose the final word on legislatures on these matters”. Roach favours institutional dialogue
to balance these considerations.
30
See, e.g., Donald Galloway, “Why the Criminal Law is Irrational” (1985) 35 U.T.L.J. 25
[hereinafter “Galloway”] and Roach, “Different Standards of Fault”, supra, note 13, at 575, noting
that if objective mens rea offences were presumptively unconstitutional but were subject to a section
1 balancing analysis, the government could likely “justify the use of negligence in connection with
manslaughter and the use of constructive liability for aggravated forms of impaired and dangerous
driving. It might also have been able to justify blended forms of subjective and objective fault with
respect to sexual assault and corporate crime”.
27
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1. Major Supreme Court Decisions on Objective and Subjective
Mens Rea
Not long before the Charter was enacted, in R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City),
Dickson J. (as he then was), writing for the Court, penned the “most wellknown subjectivist statement about mens rea and true crime in Canadian
law”.31 He wrote: “Within the context of a criminal prosecution a person
who fails to make such enquiries as a reasonable and prudent person would
make, or who fails to know facts he should have known, is innocent in the
eyes of the law.”32 He affirmed the statutory presumption that true crimes
require proof of subjective mens rea33 and established a further presumption
that regulatory offences admit of a due diligence defence.34 Justice Charron
later characterized these presumptions as “presumptive principles of criminal justice”.35
The Court demonstrated a strong commitment to subjectivism in the
decade the Charter was enacted. In R. v. Pappajohn, the majority concluded the defendant in a rape case could be acquitted if he honestly
believed the complainant was consenting, even if his belief was unreasonable.36 In the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, Lamer J. (as he then
31

Paciocco, “Subjective and Objective Standards”, supra, note 13, at 274. Paciocco goes on
to remark, “[i]t is debatable whether the classic passage from Sault Ste. Marie was ever accurate in
its suggestion that criminal liability requires subjective fault. We have consistently found clever
ways to criminalize the unthinking” (id., at 275). R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] S.C.J. No. 59,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sault Ste. Marie”].
32
Sault Ste. Marie, id., at 1309-10 (S.C.R.).
33
The presumption that true crimes require proof of subjective mens rea had already been
articulated in earlier cases. See R. v. Beaver, [1957] S.C.J. No. 32, [1957] S.C.R. 531 (S.C.C.); and
Sherras v. De Rutzen, [1895] 1 Q.B. 918 (Div. Ct.). See also R. v. Pierce Fisheries, [1970] S.C.J.
No. 58, [1971] S.C.R. 5 (S.C.C.), holding that the presumption does not apply to regulatory offences.
34
True crimes require proof of mens rea whereas regulatory offences do not. Because this
paper is concerned with mens rea, its focus is on true crimes. Regulatory offences are divided into
strict liability offences, which admit of a due diligence defence, and absolute liability offences,
which do not. Thus, Sault Ste. Marie in effect established a statutory presumption that regulatory
offences are strict liability offences, not absolute liability offences: Sault Ste. Marie, supra, note 31,
at 1325-36. The due diligence defence applies when the accused “establishes, on a balance of
probabilities ... that he or she took reasonable care or made a reasonable mistake”: Richard
Litkowski, “The Charter and the Principles of Criminal Responsibility: A Long and Winding Road”
[hereinafter “Litkowski”] in Jamie Cameron, ed., The Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice
System (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 1996) 271, at 271.
35
Beatty, supra, note 9, at para. 22. Justice Charron notes that before the Charter was
enacted, courts charged with assessing mens rea requirements could only police the division of
powers and interpret provisions in light of these presumptive principles: id.
36
R. v. Pappajohn, [1980] S.C.J. No. 51, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 (S.C.C.). The
unreasonableness of the putative belief in consent could, however, serve as evidence the belief was
not honestly held. The Court later clarified the defence is not available where the accused was
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was), for the majority, held that absolute liability offences involving the
possibility of imprisonment contravene section 7 of the Charter.37 Writing for the majority again in R. v. Vaillancourt, he announced that “there
is, as a principle of fundamental justice, a minimum mental state which is
an essential element of the offence” and that a small number of criminal
offences, including murder, require “a mens rea reflecting [their] particular nature” to justify their heightened penalties and stigma.38 Three years
later, in R. v. Martineau, Lamer C.J.C. established the minimum mens rea
requirement for murder: “proof beyond a reasonable doubt of subjective
foresight of death”.39 Martineau “represents the apotheosis of subjectivism as a constitutional norm”.40 After these decisions, many anticipated
the Court would entrench constitutional subjective mens rea requirements for numerous other offences.41 It did not.42
In R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, the Court held the mens
rea for any offence “may be demonstrated by proof of intent, whether
subjective or objective, or by proof of negligent conduct, depending on
the nature of the offence”.43 In R. v. DeSousa, it found the accused need
not actually intend the consequences of an “otherwise blameworthy
act”.44 These cases made it clear that an objective mens rea standard is
constitutionally sufficient for most crimes45 but left open the question of
how that standard should be formulated.46
The Court soon addressed this question in R. v. Hundal, wherein
it held that the mens rea standard for dangerous driving is a marked

wilfully blind to the lack of consent: R. v. Sansregret, [1985] S.C.J. No. 23, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570
(S.C.C.). In addition, contra R. v. Pappajohn, the Criminal Code now conditions the mistaken belief
in consent defence on the accused having taken reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant was
consenting: Criminal Code, supra, note 1, s. 273.2.
37
B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 27.
38
[1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at 652-53 (S.C.C.).
39
[1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 646 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martineau”].
40
Cairns Way, “Culpability”, supra, note 15, at 59.
41
Stribopoulos, supra, note 15, at 251; Litkowski, supra, note 34, at 275.
42
Stribopoulos, id.
43
[1992] S.C.J. No. 67, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, at 659 (S.C.C.), quoting R. v. Wholesale
Travel Group Inc., [1991] S.C.J. No. 79, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 (S.C.C.), per Cory J. Here, “nature of
the offence” refers to the distinction between true crimes and regulatory offences established in Sault Ste.
Marie, supra, note 31. See infra, note 45. Proof of negligent conduct suffices for regulatory
offences, whereas proof of subjective or objective intent is required for true crimes.
44
[1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944, at 967 (S.C.C.).
45
Don Stuart, “The Supreme Court Drastically Reduces the Constitutional Requirement of
Fault: A Triumph of Pragmatism and Law Enforcement Expediency” (1992) 215 C.R. (4th) 88, at 92.
46
Stribopoulos, supra, note 15, at 279.
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departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person.47 Justice Cory,
writing for the majority, added: “The potential harshness of the objective
standard may be lessened by the consideration of certain personal factors”
that may negate fault, such as an unexpected seizure, heart attack, or
detached retina.48 He described this test as a “modified objective test”.49
A few months after Hundal, McLachlin J. (as she then was), writing for a
bare majority in R. v. Creighton and its three companion cases, affirmed
the modified objective test.50 She held, further, that the accused’s level of
ability and experience is irrelevant to the test, but added the caveat that
the accused must be acquitted if he or she is incapable of meeting
the standard of care.51 The modified objective test is considered in more
detail in Part V.
By fully entrenching the modified objective test, Creighton and its
companion cases confirmed the Court’s retreat from the strong subjectivism
expressed in Sault Ste. Marie. As Cairns Way puts it, “[n]either the promise
nor the peril, depending on your point of view, of the [Court’s early] constitutional decisions have materialized”.52 Yet, while the Court has not
adhered to strong subjectivism, neither has it embraced contextualism. It
has maintained the core subjectivist principle that blameworthiness is primarily a function of the accused’s mental state while nevertheless accepting
an objective mens rea standard for many crimes. This seemingly inconsistent approach has attracted much scholarly attention.

47

Hundal, supra, note 19.
Id., at 883. In her concurring reasons, McLachlin J. (as she then was) noted that someone
who drives in a dangerous manner while having a seizure, or after losing consciousness due to a
heart attack, lacks the voluntariness necessary to establish the actus reus. It should therefore be
unnecessary to consider the mens rea element at all: id., at 875-76. I think Cory J.’s detached retina
example is more apposite, since a person with a detached retina retains voluntary control over her
movements, although McLachlin J. would frame the detached retina example in terms of
involuntariness, too. She writes: “The better analysis, in my view, is that the onset of a ‘disease or
disability’ makes the act of losing control of the motor vehicle involuntary, with the result that there
is no actus reus”: id., at 875.
49
Id., at 887.
50
R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Creighton”]. Creighton’s three companion cases are R. v. Gosset, [1993] S.C.J. No. 88, [1993]
3 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.); R. v. Naglik, [1993] S.C.J. No. 92, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122 (S.C.C.); and R. v.
Finlay, [1993] S.C.J. No. 89, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).
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Creighton, id., at 60-61: “I agree with the Chief Justice that the rule that the morally
innocent not be punished in the context of the objective test requires that the law refrain from
holding a person criminally responsible if he or she is not capable of appreciating the risk.”
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2. Subjectivism and the Limits of Section 7
Many criminal law scholars have concluded the Court is unwilling to
establish a general subjective fault requirement under section 7, despite
endorsing subjectivist principles, because it does not want to invalidate
all the objective mens rea offences in the Criminal Code, some of which
are widely accepted and regarded as important for public safety.53 In theory, the Court could constitutionalize subjectivism under section 7, then
use the section 1 balancing analysis to salvage some objective mens rea
offences. In practice, however, it has never applied section 1 to section 7
and has “expressed doubt about whether a violation of the right to life,
liberty or security of the person which is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice can ever be justified, except perhaps in
times of war or national emergencies”.54 As Kent Roach points out, constitutionalizing subjectivism would therefore mean either doing away
with all objective mens rea offences or fundamentally reconceptualizing
section 7 to make section 1 readily applicable.55
Roach claims that “subjective fault is a sufficiently compelling and
traditional standard of culpability that it should have been constitutionalized as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7”.56 He notes
that subjectivist principles have a strong pedigree in Anglo-American
criminal law, cohere with widely shared intuitions about blameworthiness, and fit best with most punishment theories.57 He argues, further,
that the section 1 balancing analysis should be more readily applied to
section 7, and that some objective mens rea offences could be justified
on this basis.58 I agree, though I will not recapitulate Roach’s arguments
53
See, e.g., Stribopoulos, supra, note 15, at 272; David M. Paciocco, Book Review of The
Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System, Jamie Cameron, ed. (1997) 28 Ottawa L. Rev.
249; Jamie Cameron, “Fault and Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” (2008) 40
S.C.L.R. (2d) 553, at 569; and Roach, “Different Standards of Fault”, supra, note 13.
54
R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, at 802 (S.C.C.), citing B.C.
Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 27, at 518. See also Thomas Lipton, “All Charter Rights are
Equal, But Some are More Equal Than Others” (2010) 52 S.C.L.R. (2d) 449, at 461-62; and Roach,
“Different Standards of Fault”, supra, note 13, at 570-71.
55
Roach, “Different Standards of Fault”, id.
56
Id., at 548.
57
Id., at 566. With respect to punishment theories, Roach notes: “A person who was not
aware of the harm that he or she caused or the risk that he or she ran cannot easily be blamed or
deterred by the use of the criminal sanction. Such persons also cannot meaningfully acknowledge
personal responsibility for the harm that they inadvertently caused”: id. Thus, objective mens rea
crimes are not easily reconciled with specific deterrence, retributive justice or restorative justice.
58
Roach suggests the government could likely justify some objective mens rea offences
such as manslaughter and “aggravated forms of impaired and dangerous driving” under section 1, as
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here. Unlike Roach, however, I think that even if subjectivism were constitutionalized under section 7, a limited number of objective mens rea
offences could be endorsed without recourse to section 1. To explain
why, I will contrast strict subjectivism, to which Roach subscribes, with
what I am calling attenuated subjectivism. But first, I will attempt to
build on Roach’s defence of subjectivism in general.

IV. ATTENUATED SUBJECTIVISM
1. The Case for Subjectivism
As we shall see, strict and attenuated subjectivists share the belief
that blameworthiness is chiefly about the actor’s mental state; indeed,
this belief is what distinguishes them from contextualists.59 Their shared
focus on the actor’s mental state is intuitive and familiar. When a toddler
colours on the wallpaper, we may scold her but we do not blame her in
the way we would blame an adult vandal. We understand she is to blame in
the causal sense (i.e., in the sense high wind is to blame for a felled tree)
but not in the moral or legal sense. The same principle is captured by the
criminal law’s capacity requirement, which makes criminal liability contingent on the defendant’s ability to understand her actions. We do not
criminally punish someone who uttered threats as a symptom of her mental disorder for the same reason we do not view the toddler as
blameworthy: we recognize that neither individual truly understood what
she was doing, and hence neither made a meaningful choice to commit
the proscribed act.
The close relationship between choice and blameworthiness (and
hence, between choice and criminal liability) is reflected in numerous

well as “some blended forms of subjective and objective fault with respect to sexual assault and
corporate crime”: id., at 575.
59
Contextualists regard blameworthiness as a function of mental state, but not exclusively
or even primarily so, inasmuch as they accept the capacity requirement. That requirement conditions
criminal liability on a minimum level of subjective awareness. In this regard, we can contrast
contextualists with consequentialists. According to consequentialists, acts are morally right or wrong
to the extent that they maximize, or fail to maximize, favourable outcomes. Because punishment is
likewise morally justified to the extent that it maximizes favourable outcomes, we ought only to
punish an individual if doing so will maximize favourable outcomes by deterring other harmful acts.
Mental state is irrelevant. See David A. Pizarro & David Tannenbaum, “Bringing Character Back:
How the Motivation to Evaluate Character Influences Judgments of Moral Blame” in Mario
Mikulincer & Philip R. Shaver, eds., The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of
Good and Evil (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press, 2012).
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criminal law doctrines apart from capacity. It underpins the voluntariness
requirement. A person who strikes another during a seizure or while
sleepwalking is not criminally responsible for her actions because she did
not choose to perform them. Again, she can only be blamed in the causal
sense.60
Choice also animates the excuses of duress and necessity. In R. v.
Ryan, the Court recalled that duress and necessity are based on the notion
of “normative involuntariness” and clarified that an act is normatively
involuntary if the actor has “no realistic choice”.61 In R. v. Perka, Dickson J.
(as he then was) explained: “At the heart of [the necessity] defence is the
perceived injustice of punishing violations of the law in circumstances in
which the person had no other viable or reasonable choice available.”62
The defence of mistake of fact reflects a similar logic. “If an accused
entertains an honest belief in the existence of a set of circumstances
which, if they existed at the time of the commission of an otherwise
criminal act, would have justified his act and rendered it non-criminal, he
is entitled to an acquittal.”63 Blackstone categorized mistake of fact as a
“defect of will”.64 In light of the mistake of fact, the accused did
not choose to perform the prohibited act in the sense of willing it or its
consequences; she thought she was doing something else. Her actions
therefore do not reflect her moral agency.
In short, the capacity and voluntariness requirements, the necessity
and duress excuses, and the mistake of fact defence all apply two widely
accepted principles: an action should not be punished unless it reflects
moral agency; and an action does not reflect moral agency unless it expresses the actor’s will. The same principles also animate subjectivism,
which is thus uniquely compatible with these criminal law doctrines.
Subjectivism also serves the main purpose of the Criminal Code,
which, as Donald Galloway notes, is to set out imperatives people are
expected to follow.65 Daniel Robinson explains that the law must require
60

R. v. Parks, [1992] S.C.J. No. 71, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 871 (S.C.C.).
[2013] S.C.J. No. 3, 2013 SCC 3, at para. 17 (S.C.C.), citing R. v. Hibbert, [1995] S.C.J.
No. 63, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973, at paras. 54 and 40 (S.C.C.): “it is a violation of s. 7 of the Charter to
convict a person who has no realistic choice and whose behaviour is, therefore, morally involuntary”
(emphasis added).
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[1984] S.C.J. No. 40, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, at 234 (S.C.C.), quoted with approval in R. v.
Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No. 25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at para. 45 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Bulmer, [1987] S.C.J. No. 28, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 782, at 789 (S.C.C.).
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Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 4 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1979), at 27.
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or prohibit that which “could be otherwise” since laws requiring the inevitable, or prohibiting the impossible, would be inane.66 Laws should
address “just those events over which persons have controlling powers
subject to their choices, decisions, volitions” — events that can be attributed to their moral agency.67 If a criminal law required or prohibited an
act that is not a function of moral agency, we could not fairly expect people to follow it and hence it would be incompatible with the core purpose
of the Criminal Code. By linking criminal liability to choice, subjectivism serves the main purpose of the Criminal Code, ensuring that the
criminal law only sets out imperatives people can be expected to follow.
For this reason, and also because it fits well with numerous criminal law
doctrines and with common intuitions about blameworthiness, subjectivism is a sound and viable theory of fault.
2. Strict Subjectivism versus Attenuated Subjectivism
I turn at last to the difference between strict and attenuated subjectivism. Galloway observes that there are, broadly speaking, three mental
states vis-à-vis harmful acts: those of a person who cannot choose to
avoid harm; a person who chooses to do harm; and a person who neither
chooses to avoid harm nor chooses to do harm.68 People in the latter
category are “oblivious to the possibility of harm because of a failure to
predict, remember, or think about what [they are] doing”.69 These three
mental states map onto the criminal law categories of involuntariness and
incapacity; intent and recklessness; and inadvertent negligence. They also
help to clarify the difference between strict and attenuated subjectivism.
Someone who lacks voluntariness or capacity cannot choose to avoid
harm. Strict and attenuated subjectivists agree she should not be
criminally punished. Someone who acts intentionally or recklessly
thereby chooses to do harm. Strict and attenuated subjectivists agree she
may be criminally punished. These points of agreement reflect the shared
focus on choice discussed above. Finally, someone who acts negligently
66
Daniel N. Robinson, “Madness, Badness, and Fitness: Law and Psychiatry (Again)”
(2000) 7:3 Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 209, at 210 (emphasis in original).
67
Id., at 210. See also Benjamin Berger, “Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in
the Criminal Law” in François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos, eds., Rethinking Criminal
Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and
International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), at 117.
68
Galloway, supra, note 30, at 29-30.
69
Id., at 30.
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neither chooses to avoid harm nor chooses to do harm. Strict and
attenuated subjectivists disagree about her status. Their disagreement is
premised on two different understandings of “choice”.
The competing understandings of choice are captured by the following two statements: (A) “we ought only to hold a person criminally liable
if we conclude, inter alia, that she deliberately chose to perform a harmful act” (where “deliberately chose” implies both an explicit choice and
moral voluntariness, i.e., an advertent choice among acceptable alternatives); and (B) “we ought only to hold a person criminally liable if we
conclude, inter alia, that she could and should have acted differently”.
I will say more about how we might determine whether someone could
and should have acted differently below.
Strict subjectivists subscribe to statement A, which insists on a deliberate choice as a condition for blameworthiness. As such, they assign
blame in cases of intent or recklessness but not negligence. Attenuated
subjectivists subscribe to statement B, which insists on a choice in the
looser sense of exercising an option. Statement B is underpinned by the
familiar edict, “ought implies can”. When we say someone could and
should have acted differently, we thereby imply she had the option to act
differently — we imply she had a choice. Indeed, we would reject the
claim that she “had no choice”. Because attenuated subjectivists do not
insist on an advertent choice, they may assign blame in cases of intent,
recklessness or negligence. In Galloway’s terms, they may endorse
criminal liability for someone who neither chooses to avoid harm nor
chooses to do harm. In the remainder of this section, I will explain why
I think this approach is preferable.
3. The Case for Attenuated Subjectivism
We have just seen that the key theoretical difference between strict
and attenuated subjectivism is the former’s insistence on deliberate
choice. What might justify this insistence?
I think the strongest argument in its favour relates to the liberal
principle that people should have a genuine opportunity to purposefully
avoid criminal sanctions by complying with the law. When we punish an
individual for taking a risk she does not actually perceive, we thereby
punish her for failing to make the choice that someone operating on a
different set of premises ought to have made. Punishment is arguably
unfair in these circumstances. Indeed, the House of Lords recently
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remarked that “[i]t is neither moral nor just to convict a defendant … on
the strength of what someone else would have apprehended if the
defendant himself had no such apprehension”.70
This argument, though compelling at first blush, is premised on an
unduly narrow view of what constitutes a genuine opportunity to comply
with the law. It presumes people do not have such an opportunity unless
they make a conscious choice to perform or forgo a prohibited act. It is
equally plausible, however, to claim people have a genuine opportunity
to comply with the law when they have both the capacity to comply and
a fair chance to do so. Hart takes this position, stating: “What is crucial is
that those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the law requires and
abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise
these capacities.”71 Where these conditions are met, a person has a genuine opportunity to comply with the law. If she fails to recognize that
opportunity because of carelessness or inattention, her failure can be attributed to her moral agency; it does not disprove the existence of the fair
opportunity.
This account of when someone has a genuine opportunity to comply
with the law accords with widely held intuitions about blameworthiness.
Galloway writes that “[t]o limit accountability to the results of conscious
choice on the basis of respect for individual autonomy is to ignore a
host of widely recognized blameworthy attitudes which we deem to be
within the control of an individual” such as laziness, forgetfulness and
obliviousness.72 Galloway asks us to compare an individual who misses
an appointment because he is unconscious in the hospital with one who
misses an appointment because he forgets.73 We blame the forgetful person but not the unconscious one, even though neither made a deliberate
choice to be truant. In the same vein, most people would not say an
oblivious hunter is blameless because she “just didn’t think” when she
fired on a populated campsite, or that a careless driver is blameless because she was not paying attention.
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Alan Brudner’s account of moral agency and negligence helps illuminate our moral intuitions about the truants, the hunter and the driver.74
Brudner explains that when a person causes an unlawful outcome, that
outcome can be attributed in whole or in part to her agency, as distinct
from chance.75 An outcome that is intentionally produced is fully attributable to agency, whereas a negligently produced outcome can be
imputed in some measure to chance.76 The degree to which an outcome
can be attributed to agency is a stable, objective criterion for assessing
blameworthiness: an act is more blameworthy to the extent that it can be
attributed to agency.77 Thus, a negligent actor is blameworthy, albeit less
so than one who acts with intent.78 On this account, we blame the forgetful truant, the oblivious hunter and the careless driver because we believe
the outcomes of their actions can be attributed, in part, to their agency. In
other words, we believe they had the capacity and the fair opportunity to
act differently. This account of agency is intuitively compelling and is
accepted within Canadian law.79
The attenuated subjectivist approach is aligned with the foregoing
account of agency and blameworthiness. In contrast, as Galloway notes,
the strict subjectivist approach “cannot be rationally premised upon any
principle of fairness that is entrenched within our culture”.80 Our common notions of fairness do not require us to withhold judgment against
the careless, clumsy or impetuous; to the contrary, we recognize that
these characteristics reflect moral agency.
Of course, the fact that we regard a person as morally blameworthy
is not, in itself, enough to justify criminal punishment. Recall that from
the subjectivist perspective, moral blameworthiness is a necessary but
insufficient condition for criminal liability. For the purposes of this paper, I will not attempt a complete account of the sufficient conditions for
criminal liability. I wish merely to make the following argument. Subjectivists in both camps agree that a defendant should not be convicted
74
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unless she had a genuine opportunity to comply with the law. Again,
strict subjectivists believe such an opportunity only exists where a defendant makes a deliberate choice to commit or avoid a prohibited act or
omission. This strict subjectivist claim is belied, however, by the claim
that inadvertent acts and omissions can reflect moral agency, a claim that
is supported by our intuitive responses to the forgetful truant, the oblivious hunter and the careless driver. Contra strict subjectivism, then, the
principle that defendants must have a genuine opportunity to comply
with the law does not entail a deliberate choice requirement.
Recall, moreover, that the subjectivist insistence on a genuine opportunity to comply with the law is premised on the liberal values of
individual choice and respect for autonomy. When we consider these
values in light of Galloway’s argument, we see that they are more consistent with the attenuated subjectivist view than with its strict subjectivist
counterpart. When we say a person did not have the opportunity to avoid
a risk, we thereby imply she was incapable of avoiding it. In some cases,
of course, she is incapable, in which case attenuated and strict subjectivists agree she should not be held criminally liable. If she is capable of
avoiding the risk, however, then respect for her agency requires us to
recognize the full scope of her capacities — including her capacities to
pay attention, predict and reason — by holding her accountable for her
failure to avoid it.81 In this light, the attenuated subjectivist approach’s
conception of moral agency is more consistent with liberalism’s respect
for individuals. The attenuated subjectivist approach therefore
does a better job of serving subjectivist values than its strict subjectivist
counterpart.
Finally, the attenuated subjectivist approach is immune to one of the
more important criticisms of subjectivism. Brudner notes that subjectivism’s focus on the defendant’s mental state is often criticized for being
overly atomistic and for overlooking “the interpersonal meaning of [the
defendant’s] act”.82 Strict subjectivism is vulnerable to this criticism because it focuses exclusively on the defendant’s mental state without regard
to the social values and expectations that motivate the criminal justice system in the first place.83 In contrast, attenuated subjectivism leaves some
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space for contextual considerations by making blameworthiness a function
of both the defendant’s mental state and social norms: the defendant’s
mental state is central to an assessment of what she could have done, while
social norms are relevant to an assessment of what she should have done.
Michael S. Moore’s analysis of the “choice” theory of excuses helps
clarify the role of social norms within the attenuated subjectivist
approach.84 According to the “choice” theory of excuses, criminal law doctrines like duress, necessity and provocation excuse wrongful acts on the
grounds that the actors did not have the capacity or the opportunity to make
a choice to do otherwise.85 Moore argues that, to understand this theory, we
must read the sentence “‘he could have done otherwise’ [as] elliptical for
‘he could have done otherwise if he had chosen to’”.86 A person “could
have done otherwise if he had chosen to” in circumstances where his choice
“was not made impossible by factors over which he had no control” (e.g., a
sudden coronary) and “was not made very difficult by factors over which he
had no control” (e.g., a knife pressed to his throat).87 The question, of
course, is what makes choices impossible or very difficult. Moore reduces
this question to two sub-issues.88 The first “relates to the equipment of the
actor: does he have sufficient choosing capacity to be responsible?”89 The
second “relates to the situation in which the actor finds himself: does that
situation present him with a fair chance to use his capacities for choice so as
to give effect to his decision?”90
My account of the attenuated subjectivist approach maps neatly onto
Moore’s analysis. First, to say “she could have acted differently” is to say
compliance with the law was not made impossible by factors over which
she had no control. To assess this criterion, we ask whether the actor had
sufficient choosing capacity to be responsible. This assessment is relatively straightforward since the doctrines of legal capacity and physical
involuntariness indicate whether or not the actor had sufficient choosing
capacity to be responsible.
Second, to say “she should have acted differently” is to say she had a
fair chance to use her choosing capacities. To assess this criterion, we ask
whether factors over which she had no control made it very difficult for
84
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her to comply. This assessment is more challenging. When do factors
outside the actor’s control make it “very difficult” for her to comply with
the law? To address this question, Moore contrasts a person who commits a wrongful act after being threatened with a person who commits
the same act out of animus. Both may feel her emotions make it very difficult for her to comply with the law, but only the former has an
acceptable excuse. Moore therefore concludes that a person who perceives that he or she has a hard choice to make may still have a fair
opportunity. Fair opportunity is “not measured by [a person’s] psychological difficulties, but rather by the objective facts of the matter”.91 It is
measured by social norms about when someone has a fair opportunity to
make a choice. Again, the attenuated subjectivist approach incorporates
these norms into its assessment of when someone “should” have done
differently.
4. The Limits of Attenuated Subjectivism
The criminal justice system is designed to promote community values and welfare. By incorporating social norms into the fault assessment
in the manner described above, the attenuated subjectivist approach
serves this intent. At the same time, however, the approach’s attention to
community norms gives rise to a major difficulty. Standards and norms
about blameworthiness are evolving and contested. Thus, to assess
whether a given objective mens rea offence is acceptable under the attenuated subjectivist approach, we must beg the essential normative
question: When is it fair to say someone should have done otherwise?
When does someone have a fair opportunity to comply with the law? In
this light, the attenuated subjectivist approach appears to be an empty
vessel.
Despite this major limitation, I think the attenuated subjectivist approach stands as a prima facie justification for one species of negligencebased crimes: crimes that occur in the context of licensed activities such
as dangerous driving or the careless storage of a firearm. The licensing
requirement creates a presumption that defendants can and should demonstrate the requisite standard of care, thereby bypassing debates about
fairness and blameworthiness. Justice Charron’s Beatty analysis reveals
why. I turn to that judgment now.
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V. GUIDANCE FROM JUSTICE CHARRON’S R. V. BEATTY JUDGMENT
1. Guidance on the Modified Objective Test
Beatty was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle
causing death after he drove into oncoming traffic and collided with another vehicle, killing its three occupants. The trial judge acquitted him,
but the British Columbia Court of Appeal ordered a new trial after finding the trial judge had misapplied the modified objective test. Justice
Charron restated that test and restored Beatty’s acquittal. In this subsection, I will briefly review her restatement of the test by way of
background before returning to the issue of attenuated subjectivism.
Justice Charron explained that the modified objective test “modifies”
the ordinary civil negligence test in two respects. First, there must be a
marked departure from the standard of care (not a mere departure, as for
civil negligence). Second, the fault analysis can include some consideration of the accused’s actual mental state.92
To explain the first modification, the requirement of a marked departure, Charron J. cited a passage from Cory J.’s Hundal reasons in which
he described driving as an “activity that is primarily reactive and not contemplative”.93 For Cory J., this description justified applying an objective
mens rea standard to driving offences. Because driving is “automatic and
reflexive”, we cannot meaningfully assess a person’s subjective intent with
respect to her driving, nor would it make sense to acquit her on the grounds
that she did not explicitly decide to drive dangerously.94 Justice Charron
affirmed this analysis but probed it more deeply. She concluded the routine nature of driving cuts both ways: it requires an objective mens rea
standard, but one that is not set too low:
Because driving, in large part, is automatic and reflexive, some
departures from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent person
will inevitably be the product, as Cory J. states, of “little conscious
thought”. … The fact that the danger may be the product of little
conscious thought becomes of concern because, as McLachlin J. (as she
then was) aptly put it in [Creighton]: “The law does not lightly brand a
person as a criminal”.95
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Virtually all drivers succumb to occasional momentary lapses of attention. If every lapse entailed criminal liability, we would criminalize
many instances of commonplace behaviour. Justice Charron cautioned
against over-criminalization and explained that the need to restrain the
scope of the criminal law justifies the requirement of a marked departure
from the standard of care: criminal liability must be more limited than
civil liability lest we risk “violating the principle of fundamental justice
that the morally innocent not be deprived of liberty”.96
Justice Charron went on to explain the second Hundal modification,
the limited consideration of the accused’s actual mental state.97 As we
have seen, Hundal said personal characteristics short of incapacity may
inform the application of the modified objective test, while Creighton
deemed them to be irrelevant.98 Following these decisions, courts
struggled with how to approach evidence of the accused’s mental state.99
Justice Charron clarified matters by delineating the actus reus and mens
rea requirements for dangerous driving. The actus reus is set by the
statute, which prohibits driving in a manner “dangerous to the public,
having regard to all the circumstances ...”.100 The mens rea is a “marked
departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the accused’s circumstances”.101 The accused’s actual state of
mind may be relevant to this analysis in three ways. First, it could satisfy
the mens rea requirement. For example, a driver who intentionally
endangers others thereby departs markedly from the standard of care.102
Second, it is relevant to some defences, such as mistake of fact.103 Third,
certain aspects of the driver’s subjective experience — for example, a
detached retina — can inform the objective inquiry.104 This latter point
explains how Hundal and Creighton sit together. Personal factors, in the
sense of attributes or abilities, are immaterial to the standard of care
itself. We do not ask what a reasonable person like the accused would
have done. That standard is, however, applied in context, and the context
may include subjective experiences particular to the accused, such as a
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Id., at para. 42.
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detached retina. We ask what a reasonable person in the accused’s
circumstances would have done.105
Justice Charron’s approach to delineating the actus reus and mens
rea for dangerous driving “sought to ensure that a meaningful analysis of
both elements would be performed in every case” and addressed the lingering concern that Hundal “did not sufficiently emphasize the
importance of giving careful attention to the fault requirement of dangerous driving”.106 Her careful attention to the fault requirement, together
with her explicit concerns about over-criminalization, suggests a subjectivist orientation. Yet, she accepted the modified objective test for
dangerous driving — a seemingly contextualist manoeuvre. Any apparent tension is resolved, however, if we read her judgment as an example
of the attenuated subjectivist approach.
2. Guidance on the Attenuated Subjectivist Approach
In his Hundal reasons, Cory J. discussed the licensing requirement
for driving, noting that the “minimum standard of physical and mental
well-being coupled with the basic knowledge of the standard of care

105
Some of the confusion surrounding the modified objective test comes, I think, from Cory J.’s
use of the term “personal factors” to describe experiences like medical emergencies. These
experiences are indeed personal in the sense that they are particular to the individual, but they are not
an aspect of personality. Justice Cory would have done better, I think, to refer to “individual
context” as opposed to “personal factors”.
106
R. v. Roy, [2012] S.C.J. No. 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60, at para. 27 (S.C.C.). Chief Justice
McLachlin, concurring in Beatty, would have defined the actus reus and mens rea elements
differently. In her view, the actus reus for dangerous driving is a marked departure from the normal
manner of driving. The mens rea can be inferred from the actus reus, though evidence might
undermine this inference: supra, note 9, at para. 67. Hamish Stewart prefers McLachlin C.J.C.’s
approach: Hamish Stewart, “Beatty: Towards a Coherent Law of Penal Negligence” (2008) 54 C.R.
(6th) 45, at 54. In his view, behaviour constituting a marked departure from the normal manner of
driving is an aspect of conduct. It should therefore be classified as an actus reus requirement, per
McLachlin C.J.C.’s approach, and not as a mens rea requirement as in Charron J.’s schema: “For, to
characterize an aspect of conduct as a fault [i.e. mens rea] element runs the risk of imposing liability
without fault, that is, the risk that triers of fact will convict on the basis of conduct alone”: id., at 52.
In other words, Stewart is concerned that if conduct alone can satisfy the mens rea requirement, we
might wind up convicting people who perform harmful actions in the absence of a blameworthy
mental state. I share Stewart’s concern about the risk of imposing liability without fault, but I think
McLachlin C.J.C.’s approach is more likely to lead to this result because it allows the mens rea to be
inferred from the actus reus. Though McLachlin C.J.C.’s approach categorizes all conduct as actus
reus, it does so at the expense of maintaining a distinct mens rea analysis. In contrast, by identifying
the marked departure standard as the mens rea element, Charron J. affirmed that even objective mens
rea offences require separate, substantive mens rea analyses. I think her insistence on a distinct mens
rea analysis ultimately does more to ensure the fault requirement will be taken seriously.
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required of licensed drivers obviate” the need for a court to establish that
“the particular accused intended or was aware of the consequences of his
or her driving”.107 Justice Charron took up this observation and used it to
ground her fault analysis. She explained that the licensing requirement is
significant for two reasons.
First, because driving is a licensed activity, we can generally assume
drivers are capable of meeting the requisite standard of care.108 In other
words, we can fairly presume a driver could have met the standard.
Second, because drivers choose to engage in a voluntary, regulated, inherently dangerous activity, a driver who fails to meet the requisite
standard “cannot be said to be morally innocent”.109 The driver is presumptively aware of the standard of care and is on notice it will be
enforced. Justice Charron therefore concluded that fault “can be based on
the voluntary undertaking of the activity, the presumed capacity to
properly do so, and the failure to meet the requisite standard of care”.110
In other words, she found the fault requirement can be met because, by
virtue of the licensing requirement, the driver presumptively could and
should have met the standard of care.
By grounding the fault requirement on the driver’s presumptive capacity and the widely held expectation of compliance, both of which are
entailed by the licensing requirement, Charron J. modelled the attenuated
subjectivist approach. Beatty thus stands as a helpful illustration of how
this approach can apply in the licensing context without resort to controversial propositions about blameworthiness and fairness.

VI. CONCLUSION
According to strict subjectivists, subjectivism is inherently incompatible
with objective mens rea offences. The attenuated subjectivist account is
more nuanced. It does not view every objective mens rea offence as a prima
facie violation of subjectivist principles. Whereas strict subjectivists believe
an actor is only blameworthy if she deliberately chooses to perform a
prohibited act, attenuated subjectivists blame her if her actions reflect her
moral agency; that is, if she could and should have done differently. On this
latter view, some negligent actors are blameworthy because in some
107
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circumstances we can fairly say that they could and should have done
differently. The challenge, of course, is identifying those circumstances.
One important set of circumstances in which the attenuated subjectivist approach applies is the licensing context. For the reasons developed
by Charron J. in Beatty, that context entitles us to presume the defendant
could and should have met the standard of care. It thereby allows us to
apply the attenuated subjectivist analysis without engaging in debates
about when someone has the capacity and the fair opportunity to comply
with the law.
In all other cases, the attenuated subjectivist approach helps us frame
the discussion by shifting the focus away from whether there was a deliberate choice to cause or risk harm towards a more expansive analysis
of blameworthiness. Where that analysis cannot be grounded in stable
premises, such as those provided by the licensing context, I think we
should err on the side of presuming that objective mens rea offences infringe section 7. As noted above, I agree with Roach that the government
should then have the opportunity to justify such offences under section 1.
My proposed approach thus encourages a multifaceted analysis of
blameworthiness; one that places the burden on the government to justify
objective mens rea offences except in clear cases of presumptive blameworthiness like those situated in the licensing context. This approach is
more nuanced than the other two approaches. Contextualism focuses on
policy considerations without sufficient regard to the defendant’s mental
state. Strict subjectivism truncates and abstracts the fault analysis by fixating on the issue of deliberate choice.
As a matter of practice, of course, the Court has not restricted objective mens rea offences to the licensing context,111 nor has it applied
sections 7 and 1 in the manner suggested by Roach. Indeed, its objective
mens rea case law is hard to reconcile from any theoretical perspective.
Yet, although the case law is challenging and the scholarly debates seem
intractable, the objective mens rea issue merits our ongoing attention.
The Court and scholars of all stripes agree that criminal punishment must
be justified by fault. This insistence on fault aims “to harmonize notions
of moral responsibility and criminal liability”.112 It aims to make the
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“[A]ny possibility of limiting objective mens rea to regulatory offences or offences
having a regulatory base has now been overtaken by the unanimous decision of the panel
(comprising a majority of the Court) in R. v. DeSousa”: Creighton, supra, note 50, at 38 (per La
Forest J.).
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Rolfes, supra, note 14, at para. 1.
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criminal justice system recognizable as a justice system. We must therefore continue to grapple with the nature of criminal fault, including in the
challenging context of objective mens rea offences, in an effort to ensure
that the criminal justice system evolves in a logical, principled manner.
What is perhaps most notable about Charron J.’s Beatty reasons is that
she undertook a careful fault analysis in the first place. She could have
elaborated the modified objective test without re-examining the Hundal
Court’s rationale for treating dangerous driving as an objective mens rea
offence. Instead, she grounded her analysis on a careful examination of
why we punish dangerous driving. In so doing, she demonstrated her
commitment to ensuring that the criminal law is not only intelligible, but
also principled and just. Whatever our views on the nature of criminal
fault, this commitment is one that we can and should admire.

